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CORPORATIONS
Nominee Voting in a Proxy Contest
Early in 1963 a minority stockholder group led by plaintiffs
attempted to elect as their representative one member of the five
man board of directors of the Peoria and Eastern Railway
Company.' In order to accomplish this plaintiffs solicited

proxies from stockholders. Fifty of the stockholders were brokerage houses which held the stock as nominees for the beneficial
owners who were their clients. Plaintiffs sent one solicitation to
each house. The custom in the brokerage business is for the house
upon receipt of one solicitation to request enough solicitations
so that the house can forward one copy to each beneficial owner
with the cost defrayed by the solicitor. Twenty-one of the
houses did not request additional solicitations. At the annual
stockholders meeting on April 12, 1963, eighteen of the twentyone houses voted the stock to which they held legal title as
nominees against the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs initiated this action to set aside the election of
the board of directors and compel the twenty-one houses to send
solicitations to the beneficial owners. The case was dismissed,
without prejudice to the plaintiffs, for failure to join the twentyone houses and the board of directors as indispensable parties to
the suit.
This case will have an important effect upon two areas in
proxy contests because it reopens two questions which the courts
had previously considered settled and closed. The first is under
what conditions will a nominee be allowed to vote the stock he
holds, and what effect the unlawful voting of that stock by the
nominee will have upon the outcome of corporate elections? The
second question is, does a private individual have a cause of action
against a firm which is a member of a national securities exchange when the member firm has violated the regulations of the
exchange and thereby caused injury to the private individual?
Previous to 1956 it had been held that when a stock is sold
and not transferred on the books of the corporation the record
holder has the right to vote the stock.2 Similarly when stock is
1 Walsh and Levine v. Peoria and Eastern Railway Company, 222 F.Supp.

516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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held by a brokerage house as nominee the house has the right to
vote the stock. 3 When stock is held in the name of a nominee
the fact that the nominee votes the stock is prima facie evidence
that the beneficial owner authorized the nominee to vote, and the
only person who could question such an authorization was the
beneficial owner.4 Even where the voting of the stock had violated the proxy regulations of the New York Stock Exchange,
the court refused to allow the injured private party in the proxy
contest a cause of action against the nominee under the theory
that the nominee brokerage firm and the New York Stock Exchange were parties to a contract, and the injured party had no
rights to sue upon that contract because it was not a party to it.
The only cause of action in such a case would be by the exchange
against the member firm.5 These decisions placed both the beneficial owner and the contestant in a proxy contest at a disadvantage. Unless the nominee forwarded the solicited material
on his own initiative, the beneficial owner would not necessarily
know the true state of affairs in the corporation, and the contestant would not be able to reach the beneficial owner because
the nominee was under no duty to forward the material or to
disclose the names of the beneficial owners.
Pursuant to the duties of the Securities and Exchange Commission to protect the public interest and to act as an impartial
referee between proxy contestants, the commission in 1956 revised it rules dealing with proxy contests. The Peoria case is
only the most recent decision that reverses the old rule of evidence
that the voting by a nominee is prima facie evidence that the
6
nominee had the authorization of the beneficial owner to vote.
Under the revised rules if a nominee unlawfully votes its stock,
an injured third party may now question the authorization of the
nominee to vote and make additional proof necessary by the
nominee.
2 Thompson v. Blaisdell, 107 A. 405, 93 NJL 31 (1919); Wick v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co, 188 N.E. 514, 46 OA 253 (1932); In re

Giant Portland Cement, 21 A.2d 697, 26 DCh 32 (1941).

3 In re Pressed Steel Car Co, 16 F.Supp. 329 (W.D.Pa. 1936); Atterbury
v. Consolidated Copper Mines Corp, 20 A.2d 743, 26 DCh 32 (1941);
McLain v. Lanova Corp, 29 A.2d 209, 28 DCh 176 (1944); Tracy v.
Brentwood Village Corp., 59 A.2d 708, 30 DCh 406 (1948).
4

In re Canal Const, 182 A. 545, 21 DCh 155 (1936); In re Giant Portland
Cement, supra; In re Pressed Steel Car Co, supra.
5 In re Pressed Steel Car Co., supra.
6 Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp, 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
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A nominee may still vote but strict limitations have been
placed upon this right. The revised rules give the nominee two
alterative courses of action. Under the first alternative the
nominee may conform to the new rules and file a declaration of
information on schedule 14B as an interested party to the contest.
The nominee is then free to choose sides in the contest, solicit
proxies, and vote them. But part of the information required in
schedule 14B makes the nominee disclose the amount of stock
he holds as nominee and the names of the beneficial owners.1
Thus the records of the brokerage firm would become a matter
of public record assuring both contestants a chance to reach the
beneficial owners with their solicitation material. But because
the firm's records will become a matter of public record it will
be only under very unusual circumstances that this alternative
will be followed.
The second alternative allows the nominee to exempt himself from conforming to the new rules if he meets certain requirements.8 The nominee must forward all information to the
beneficial owner without compensation except for the defrayment of costs by the person making the solicitation. Upon forwarding this information the nominee must instruct the beneficial
owner to send the proxy to the solicitor or to return it to the
nominee who will vote it in accordance with the instructions of
the beneficial owner, and if the beneficial owner does neither of
S.E.C. Rule 14a-11 (c3), (17 C.F.R. #240.14a-11

(c3), Supp. 1963).
"(b) State the amount of each class of securities of the issuer
which you own of record by not beneficially."
"(f) State the amount of securities of the issuer owned beneficially, directly or indirectly, by each of your associates and the
name and address of each such associate."
8 S.E.C. Rule 14a-2,
(17 C.F.R. #240.14a-2, Supp. 1963).
"(b) Any solicitations by a person in respect to any securities
7

carried in his name or in the name of his nominee
person:
"(1) Receives no commission or remuneration ...

reimbursement of reasonable expenses;
"(2)
solicited
"(3)
solicited

....
,

if such
other than

Furnishes promptly to the person solicited a copy of all
material ...;
. . . does no more than impartially instruct the person
to forward a proxy to the person, if any, to whom the

person solicited desires to give a proxy, or impartially request from
the person solicited instructions as to the authority to be conferred
by the proxy and state that a proxy will be given if no instructions

are received by a certain date."
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these within a stated time before the election, the nominee then
has the implied authority of the beneficial owner to vote the stock
as he feels is in the best interests of the beneficial owner. Because
only the nominee knows how many beneficial owners for whom
he holds stock, the Peoria case logically interprets the revised
rules so as to place a duty upon the nominee to request from the
solicitor enough solicitations so that one copy can be forwarded
to each beneficial owner. And if the nominee votes the stock
without following either of these two alternatives, the Peoria
case strongly suggests that the results of an election would be set
aside by the court if the contested votes would change the results
of the election.
In 1961 the federal courts allowed injured private parties to
bring suit against companies that violated the Securities and Exchange Commission regulations without waiting for the commission to bring the action.9 The next logical step would be for the
courts to allow injured private parties to bring suit against
brokerage firms which violate the rules of the national exchange
of which the firms are members. The Peoriacase does not directly
decide this issue, but in very cautious language it suggests that the
court may in the future uphold such an action by a private party,
stating; "... by reason of the regulated nature and the regulatory
function of the national securities acts, [the rules of the national
securities exchanges] establish public duties on the part of the
brokers which may give rise to private suits cognizable by this
court." 10 The reasoning of the court seems to be that while a
contract exists between the national securities exchanges and their
member firms, private parties are also parties to that contract as
third party beneficiaries. This slight suggestion reopens the question previously decided in 1936 by a federal court when it stated
positively that a private party has no cause of action against a
firm which violates the rules of the exchange of which it is a
member." If this suggestion in the case should become a general
policy of the courts, it will undoubtedly increase self-regulation
and stricter control by the individual firms in all phases of their
securities practice, and a new area of litigation will be opened up
for the courts.
J.L.V.
9

Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Dann v. StudebakerPackard Corp., supra.

10Walsh and Levine v. Peoria and Eastern Railway Company, supra,
p. 519.

11 In re Pressed Steel Car Co, supra.

